Tanking, the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game in order to gain some other advantage, is usually seen as being against the spirit of sports. It is especially problematic when the two teams playing a match are both interested in a draw, since it may lead to tacit collusion. It is revealed that this situation occurred in a particular football match played between Greece and Iceland in the elite round of the 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualification. We prove that the root of the problem is the incentive incompatible design of recent UEFA qualification tournaments.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that any tournament design should provide contestants with the appropriate incentives to perform (Szymanski, 2003) . However, some sports rules seem to inspire tanking, the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game in order to secure an advantage in every possible case.
2 Examples include a famous football 3 match between Barbados and Grenada in the 1994 Caribbean Cup qualification (Kendall and Lenten, 2017 , Section 3.9.4), qualifications for FIFA Worlds Cups (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013; Csató, 2017) , UEFA club competitions (Dagaev and Sonin, 2017; Csató, 2018c,e) , and UEFA European Championships (Csató, 2018a,d) , or certain tournaments with subsequent group stages (Csató, 2018b) .
While it is usually unacceptable when a team can be strictly better off by losing, there are some potential arguments which decrease the importance of incentive incompatibility in practice. First, the probability that such a situation occurs is often (very) low. Second, one may think that both teams cannot be interested in losing.
In the following, we show a real-world example when playing a draw was the only opportunity to qualify for two teams playing against each other. This football match is mentioned in Kendall and Lenten (2017) without further analysis.
4 After that, we reveal the causes of the bizarre situation.
To illustrate the strength of our concept, consider the notorious football match called 'Nichtangriffspakt (or Schande) von Gijón'
5 (Kendall and Lenten, 2017 , Section 3.9.1). It was the final game of Group 2 of the 1982 FIFA World Cup, played by West Germany and Austria. A win by one or two goals for West Germany would result in both teams qualifying at the expense of Algeria, while all other results would lead to the elimination of either West Germany or Austria. After ten minutes West Germany scored, and the remaining 80 minutes was characterized by few serious attempts to attack. However, playing 1-0 is not a strictly dominant strategy for the teams. West Germany would not lose anything by kicking an additional goal, and the same holds for Austria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the particular match where the optimal strategy was a tacit collusion of the two teams. The theoretical background is described in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
The real-world example
The 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualification was a football competition, organised by the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), to determine the national teams participating in the 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship final tournament.
6 53 national teams entered the tournament, which was played in two group stages between September 2015 and April 2016. The qualifying round was followed by the elite round, where 32 teams were drawn into eight groups of four teams each. All competition matches were played as round-robin mini-tournaments in one of the countries in the group, with three points awarded for a win, one for a draw and none for a defeat (UEFA, 2015, Article 13).
Tie A bizarre situation occurred in Group 6 of the elite round, which deserves further investigation. On the morning of 3 April 2016, each team in the group had one more game to play. Table 1 shows the known results and the preliminary standing of the group. All other groups were finished by this date, the worst runner-up being Poland with 1 point, 1 goal for and 2 goals against after discarding its match played against the fourth-placed team of its group.
We will analyse the possible scenarios by focusing on the match between Greece and Iceland. Both teams are eliminated if Austria defeats France. If Austria does not win against France, then the winner would be the runner-up, with 1 point, 0 goals for and 1 goal against in the ranking of second-placed teams, therefore it would be eliminated as the worst runner-up. Consequently, if Austria draws against France, both Greece and Iceland are eliminated.
However, Greece or Iceland has an opportunity to qualify if Austria is defeated by France and they play a draw by scoring at least one goal (in the case of 0-0, Poland is better among the second-placed teams). Then three teams would have 2 points and group tie-breaking rule d. provides that Greece and Iceland overtake Austria due to their higher number of head-to-head goals scored. The runner-up would be determined by criterion g. of disciplinary points (or by a coin toss according to h., if it is necessary).
7 If the result is 7 One may think that these relatively unknown tie-breaking rules are almost never applied in practice.
1-1, the runner-up has an identical goal record to Poland among the second-placed teams, so disciplinary points count, but with a draw of at least 2-2, it qualifies ahead of Poland. To summarize, the optimal strategy of Greece and Iceland is to play a draw of at least 2-2, independently of the match organised at the same time between Austria and France. Provided that it is reached -not a big challenge since both teams are interested in this result -, their objective function is to increase the number of disciplinary points of the other team, that is, to force the players of the opponent to commit offences. No team has an ex-ante advantage in disciplinary points because Greece collected one yellow card against France and two against Austria, while Iceland collected one yellow card against Austria and two against France. Alternatively, they can collude tacitly to play a draw of 2-2 and wait patiently for the coin toss to determine the team that has a chance to qualify, depending on the result of the match Austria vs France.
The strictly dominant strategy of Greece and Iceland seems to be against the intention of administrators. First, it may result in the elimination of a third team. Second, the rules discourage both teams to kick goals in a particular case, furthermore, players can be interested in improving other match statistics than the number of goals.
Discussion
The root of the problem is the comparison of the second-placed teams -which have not played any matches against each other -in a badly designed repechage group. Csató (2018a) has proved that the application of the same monotonic ranking for each group including the repechage is insufficient to guarantee the strategy-proofness of the whole qualification system unless the set of matches considered in the repechage group is chosen appropriately. In other words, it may happen that one team has an incentive to exert a lower effort.
According to the example in Section 2, the situation can be even worse when both teams are interested in tanking. Since it makes not much sense to repeat the cumbersome analysis provided in Csató (2018a) , in the following we only use the simpler model of Csató (2018d) , which still covers recent qualification tournaments in football.
Consider a group-based qualification system where the participating teams are divided into ≥ 2 round-robin groups such that the number of teams is in group , = 1, 2, . . . , . Under any set of match results R, the top ≥ 0 teams in group directly qualify, while the next ≥ 0 teams -whose set is denoted by (R) -are compared in a so-called repechage group. The remaining − − ≥ 0 teams are eliminated.
Let (R) = ∑︀ =1 (R) be the set of teams in the repechage group, where only the group matches played against the top teams are considered such that + ≤ ≤ . On the basis of match results R, teams are allocated into three distinct sets 1 (R), 2 (R), and 3 (R), which correspond to the set of teams directly qualified, advanced to play-offs, and being eliminated, respectively. It means that each team prefers being in 1 (R) to being in 2 (R) ∪ 3 (R), and they favour being in 2 (R) over being in 3 (R). Allocation is assumed to be monotonic, that is, no team can achieve a better position in its group and in the repechage group by having less number of points or goals.
Let be a group-based qualification system with the set of match results R and , be two teams in the same group . The set of match results R ′ xy is said to be advantageous However, Poland obtained the second place due to a penalty shootout against Ireland in Group 7 of this competition, and Belgium overtook Spain for the top position with penalties after the end of their match in Group 8.
for team with respect to its match(es) against , if R and R ′ xy are identical except that team has scored more goals against in R ′ xy .
Definition 3.1. Tacit collusion: Let be a group-based qualification system and R be a set of match results. Teams and in the same group can collude tacitly if
• one of the following holds for all set of match results R ′ xy , which are advantageous for team : (1) ∈ 1 (R) but ∈ 2 (R ′ xy ) ∪ 3 (R ′ xy ); or (2) ∈ 2 (R) but ∈ 1 (R ′ xy ); and
• one of the following holds for all set of match results R ′ yx , which are advantageous for team :
In other words, teams and are strictly worse off if they kick a goal against the other.
The setting above may allow for tacit collusion. • there is a difference in the allocation of teams in the repechage group, that is, at least two of the sets (R) ∩ 1 (R), (R) ∩ 2 (R), and (R) ∩ 3 (R) is non-empty;
• a proper subset of group matches played against lower ranked teams in the group are considered in the repechage group, that is, + < < .
Proof. It is enough to show an example where two teams can collude tacitly, and one can use the case presented in Section 2. There = 1, = 1, = 3, and = 4, and this construction works for = 0, = 1, = 2, and = 3 by discarding France, as well as for any other values satisfying the conditions of Proposition 3.1.
The second requirement guarantees that achieving a better position among the teams of the repechage group is effective with respect to qualification -a crucial part of the problem in Section 2 was the differentiation of runners-up.
The third condition provides that a team can improve its position in the repechage group -by influencing its set of matches taken into account -through not kicking more goals, which is impossible if all matches played against teams ranked lower than the team relegated to the repechage group from are discarded or counted.
Remark 3.1. If there is a group-based qualification system allowing for a tacit collusion of two teams, and tie-breaking rules contain other match statistics than the number of goals (such as disciplinary points), then these two teams may be interested in improving this particular match statistics instead of goals.
It is worth to note that UEFA modified tie-breaking rules from the 2017 UEFA European Under-17 Championship and its qualification (UEFA, 2016), as well as, from the 2017 UEFA European Under-19 Championship and its qualification. To be more specific, they have added a criterion before drawing of lots both in the groups (h.) and in the repechage group (e.) as higher position in the coefficient ranking list used for the qualifying round draw. While it does not give a strict ranking of the teams, it substantially decreases the probability that some teams should be ranked by a coin toss. This change might have worsened the situation presented in Section 2. The coefficient of Greece was lower than the coefficient of Iceland, therefore for Greece, the only opportunity to qualify was to play a draw of at least 2-2 and ensure that Iceland has more disciplinary points (their players get more yellow/red cards during the match).
Finally, the case presented in Section 2 also highlighted the importance of tie-breaking rules, which deserves more attention (Berker, 2014) .
Conclusions
Austria defeated France, so Greece and Iceland had no chance to qualify. Perhaps their players were well-informed on the result of the parallel match, and they did not want to risk the tacit collusion. Nevertheless, it is clear that a serious scandal was barely avoided during the 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualifying competition. It seems to be an undeniable warning for the governing bodies of major sports to choose strategy-proof designs in the future. For example, FIFA and UEFA are advised to follow one of the two mechanisms suggested in Csató (2018a) . Hopefully, the decision of the FIFA Council on the use of a new formula for the FIFA / Coca-Cola World Ranking on 10 June 2018 (FIFA, 2018) indicates that administrators are increasingly open to criticism from the scientific community (Lasek et al., 2013 (Lasek et al., , 2016 .
